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The Diplomat
2 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
India's Monarchy Fantasy in Nepal Is a Strategic Mirage
The vision of a pro-India monarch is a dangerous misreading of Nepal's history, its political complexities, and the implications for India's regional interests. In recent months, pro-monarchy demonstrations have flared across Nepal, with some protesters carrying posters of Indian Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. These symbolic gestures are not incidental. They signal a growing ideological intersection between Nepal's royalist nostalgia and India's rising Hindu nationalism. For some in India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – and its ideological mentor, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – the return of a Hindu monarchy in Nepal is being framed as both a civilizational triumph and a strategic necessity. But this vision is a dangerous misreading of Nepal's history, its political complexities, and the implications for India's regional interests. For India, the idea of a culturally aligned, Hindu-majority monarchy in Nepal appears attractive amid the growing Chinese presence in the region. Proponents argue that a Hindu king could serve as a bulwark against Beijing, foster cultural affinity, and stabilize a politically turbulent neighbor. This narrative has gained traction among Indian right-wing commentators and politicians alike, echoing similar ideological currents across the subcontinent. But this fantasy is historically flawed and strategically shortsighted. Nepal's monarchy was never the steadfast Indian ally it is now nostalgically remembered as. After King Tribhuvan's exile and return with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's support in 1950, hopes for a constitutional monarchy in Nepal were high. Yet these hopes were quickly dashed. King Mahendra's 1960 royal coup dismantled the nascent democracy, suppressed pro-India politicians, and aligned Nepal closer to China – a pattern that recurred with his son, King Gyanendra, during his 2005-08 power grab. Rather than strengthening ties with India, these monarchs often positioned themselves in opposition to Indian influence, using Hindu nationalism to consolidate internal power and assert sovereignty. Gyanendra's regime, in particular, alienated New Delhi and created fertile ground for Chinese strategic inroads. Far from a stabilizing force, Nepal's monarchy repeatedly proved to be a source of autocracy and diplomatic estrangement. The renewed royalist fervor in Nepal is often conflated with calls to re-establish a Hindu state. But not all supporters of a Hindu identity in Nepal support restoring the monarchy. The Nepali Congress, one of the country's largest democratic parties, has formally endorsed the idea of a Hindu state, while opposing monarchical rule. This distinction is crucial. While monarchy implies authoritarian rule, calls for a Hindu state are more about cultural assertion – especially amid growing anxieties over federalism, secularism, and demographic change. Still, both narratives stem from widespread public frustration with Nepal's current political system. Since the monarchy's abolition in 2008, no elected government has completed a full term. Federalism, while progressive in theory, is seen by many Nepalis as creating more inefficiency and corruption, summed up in the popular quip: 'Earlier we had one king, now we have 761.' This disillusionment is the fertile ground on which royalist and theocratic fantasies grow. The BJP-RSS establishment's embrace of Nepal's monarchists reflects more than strategic calculation; it is rooted in a shared ideological affinity for majoritarian nationalism and centralized religious authority. Figures like Yogi Adityanath – who symbolize the fusion of Hindu religiosity and political power – are seen by Nepal's royalist right as aspirational models. The imagery of Adityanath at Nepal's protests is a visual manifestation of this ideological export. Yet India's historical actions have not always helped its image in Nepal. Two unofficial blockades – one in 1989 and another in 2015 – inflicted economic hardship and deepened resentment. Meanwhile, perceptions of Indian interference in Nepal's domestic politics remain strong, further complicated by conspiracy theories (such as India's alleged role in the 2001 royal massacre) that, while baseless, are emotionally potent. These legacies have allowed China to position itself as a 'non-interfering partner' and expand its footprint through infrastructure investments, soft power, and engagement with Nepal's security apparatus. In contrast, India's growing ideological alignment with monarchy risks alienating democratic forces within Nepal and undermining its long-term influence. Restoring a monarchy in Nepal won't fix the structural issues that fuel instability: youth unemployment, rural poverty, and elite-driven governance. Over 4 million Nepalis now work abroad, and remittances equate to nearly 30 percent of GDP. Nepal's economy remains heavily dependent on India, especially for trade, electricity, and transit infrastructure. India has made quiet but substantial investments in this sector – from the 900 MW Arun-III hydropower project to completed railway links like Jaynagar–Bardibas. Cross-border electricity transmission lines and the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal) initiative could position Nepal as a clean energy exporter in the region. These are the kinds of practical integrations that truly stabilize bilateral relations – not ideological posturing. Meanwhile, Nepal's elected communist leaders – despite occasional anti-India rhetoric – have maintained functional ties with New Delhi. Leaders like Pushpa Kamal Dahal and current Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli may wave nationalist flags, but their electoral legitimacy requires ongoing engagement with India. Even critics of federalism are not necessarily calling for a return to monarchy, but rather for reforms that make democracy deliver. Ultimately, betting on monarchy is not a foreign policy strategy – it's an ideological fantasy. If India wants to compete with China and maintain long-term influence in Nepal, it must invest in pluralism, economic cooperation, and democratic consolidation. The imagery of Yogi Adityanath in Kathmandu may excite some in Nagpur, but it alarms many in Nepal – and even more in India's diplomatic community. India's strength in South Asia has always come from its democratic model, not its imperial ambitions. Replacing that model with nostalgia for crowns and gods will only open the door further to adversaries who offer infrastructure without interference, and partnership without prescriptions.
The Diplomat
4 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Mongolia's Government Transition: Democracy in Action or Foreign Interference?
A recent report alleges that Mongolia's change in government was the product of a Moscow-linked influence operation. Far from it. Mongolia's recent change in government has been widely debated, with some international media outlets speculating about foreign interference. Such claims overlook the deeper democratic processes at play. Far from it, the leadership transition reflects Mongolia's evolving political maturity and the public's demand for transparency and accountability. On June 11, British newspaper The Times published an article alleging that Mongolia's recent change in government was shaped by Kremlin-linked influence and internal power struggles. The article went so far as to frame Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai's resignation as 'an effective coup,' a characterization based solely on unnamed government sources and not corroborated by any other independent outlet. The piece portrayed Mongolia's domestic politics as potentially vulnerable to manipulation by external actors. While this perspective may resonate with broader geopolitical concerns, it overlooks the complex internal dynamics and democratic processes that in fact drove recent developments. A Crisis of Communication and Credibility, Not Foreign Interference The resignation of Oyun-Erdene was not the result of foreign interference. It was the outcome of a lawful democratic process, triggered by sustained public protests over allegations of corruption and government opacity. What began as an organic youth movement, sparked by revelations about the prime minister's son's life of luxury, evolved into a broader call for transparency, integrity, and reform. What ultimately sealed Oyun-Erdene's fate was not external meddling but his failure to engage meaningfully with the public. This misstep is striking, given that in December 2022 he had met face-to-face with thousands protesting corruption in the coal sector. His personal appearance back then defused tensions and earned his government time. When this round of protests began in May 2025, protestors initially made a modest demand: they asked Oyun-Erdene to explain his son's lavish lifestyle, as displayed in social media posts. Yet the prime minister declined to engage, offered no explanation, and appeared to dismiss their concerns. His remarks, referring to protestors as 'flies' and questioning the protests' authenticity, only deepened the disconnect. What began as a call for accountability gradually became a call for resignation. In parliament, Oyun-Erdene argued that his government needed more time to deliver on mega-projects that would, he claimed, raise GDP per capita to $10,000. But after five years, the longest tenure of any prime minister in modern Mongolian history, the public's patience had worn thin. The promise that stability would bring prosperity was no longer convincing; his credibility had eroded. Legislators thus faced a difficult choice: preserve executive stability or respond to an increasingly vocal electorate. The no-confidence vote that followed was not a coup or the product of foreign plots. It was the lawful exercise of democratic checks and balances by elected representatives responding to their constituents. Reuters, the Associated Press, and Al Jazeera all reported the episode as an example of democracy at work, not the result of foreign manipulation. The Danger of Simplistic Narratives Mongolia's geography, landlocked between China and Russia, and its complex foreign policy naturally draw scrutiny. International partners are right to be vigilant about undue foreign influence in any small democracy facing external pressures. But vigilance must not slide into oversimplification. Portraying domestic political developments as mere extensions of great power rivalry diminishes Mongolia's agency and misrepresents its democracy. This is not just a matter of fairness. It is precisely because of Mongolia's foreign policy challenges that such narratives could be so damaging. By portraying Mongolia's democracy as weak and easily manipulated by one of its neighbors, this type of reporting may undermine efforts to strengthen ties not only with China and Russia but also with its so-called third neighbors, including the European Union, Japan, and the United States. If these partners come to see Mongolia as anything less than an independent, sovereign democracy, they will hesitate to deepen engagement. That would be a severe setback at a moment when Mongolia urgently needs investment, cultural exchange, stronger institutions, and deeper diplomatic partnerships. The threat goes well beyond economics. Mongolia's democracy already faces pressures identified by indices such as V-Dem, including diminishing media freedom, reduced judicial independence, and declining public trust. Its health depends on continued support from democratic partners. Emphasizing unverified narratives of foreign manipulation risks weakening Mongolia's international standing, feeding public cynicism, and hampering its ability to build the partnerships essential for protecting its democratic progress. Mongolia's Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh has publicly challenged the narrative presented in The Times, emphasizing that such portrayals misrepresent the country's political realities and risk undermining its diplomatic credibility. In a recent interview with Arctus Analytics, an Ulaanbaatar-based research and analysis firm, she elaborated on the government's broader concerns about the increasing complexity of Mongolia's international engagement. 'Our foreign relations have expanded rapidly in recent years,' she noted. 'This growth has brought many new actors into the space, including government agencies, local authorities, businesses, and civil society organizations. While this is a welcome sign of international engagement, it also underscores the need for better coordination and oversight, aligned with Mongolia's national interests and security.' Battsetseg revealed that the government is in the process of drafting a comprehensive law to establish clearer guidelines on who may engage in foreign relations on behalf of the state and under what conditions. 'Had such a framework been in place earlier,' she added, 'we might have avoided some of the confusion and misrepresentation that arose from recent international reporting.' Mongolia's Balanced Diplomacy and Expanding Global Partnerships Mongolia's multi-pillared foreign policy is designed to preserve its sovereignty by engaging a wide range of partners and expanding the areas of cooperation. The country maintains strategic partnerships with China and Russia while actively cultivating strong ties with third neighbors such as Japan, the European Union, and other like-minded democracies. What makes this approach effective is not merely the number of partners but also the growing diversity of fields in which Mongolia engages, including mining, infrastructure, energy, education, technology, climate resilience, and cultural exchange. This strategy has delivered tangible results. Japan's support for infrastructure modernization and France's investment in Mongolia's uranium sector demonstrate how Ulaanbaatar has broadened cooperation with trusted partners. Mongolia's uranium partnership with France in particular represents the first major investment from a Western partner since the Oyu Tolgoi agreement and marks a significant milestone in third neighbor cooperation. Mongolia's diplomatic activity also underscores its success in building credibility on the international stage. In 2023 alone, the country hosted or conducted 12 presidential-level visits, six by parliamentary speakers, five by prime ministers, and 23 by foreign ministers, signing 41 intergovernmental documents across diverse sectors. The momentum continued in 2024 with 15 presidential visits, eight prime ministerial meetings, and 19 foreign ministry consultations, reflecting growing international interest in Ulaanbaatar as a credible and neutral interlocutor committed to balanced engagement. At the same time, Mongolia has strengthened its balanced relations with its two neighbors. Recent agreements with China and Russia include a cross-border railway accord to enhance connectivity and a deal to expand and modernize a key power station. These steps show that Mongolia's balanced foreign policy is not merely aspirational; it is being actively implemented. A Call for Thoughtful Engagement Mongolia's recent change in government was not the product of foreign manipulation. It was the outcome of a people holding their leaders accountable through lawful and democratic means. This is not the story of a pawn caught between powerful neighbors. It is the story of a democracy, imperfect yet resilient, determined to chart its own course in a complex region. Oversimplified narratives that portray Mongolia as vulnerable to external manipulation risk undermining the progress the country has made. They damage its standing on the international stage and jeopardize efforts to deepen ties not only with its immediate neighbors but also with trusted partners across the democratic world. Mongolia's diplomacy, marked by new agreements with both neighbors and third neighbor countries, shows that its multi-pillared foreign policy is being implemented in practice, not just in principle. Mongolia deserves thoughtful engagement from international partners who are committed to supporting its sovereignty and its efforts to maintain balance in a challenging geopolitical environment. In an era of rising polarization and competing narratives, responsible journalism and principled diplomacy are not luxuries for small democracies like Mongolia. They are essential safeguards for a nation working to secure its place as a credible, independent, and constructive member of the international community.
The Diplomat
4 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Reframing the French Indo-Pacific: French Polynesia, a Model of Shared Sovereignty?
French Polynesia is a pivotal element of France's strategy in the Pacific – and offers a compelling case study for shared sovereignty within the French Republic. As Emmanuel Macron wrapped up his visits to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore – where he delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue at the end of May – the French president reaffirmed the Indo-Pacific's strategic importance for both France and Europe. In a context of growing geopolitical uncertainty and renewed unilateralism, Macron emphasized France's commitment to a stable, multipolar order grounded in international law, freedom of navigation, and inclusive multilateralism – an international posture shared with key partners such as India, Japan, and ASEAN. Building on this common strategic vision, and as the only remaining European Union (EU) member state with sovereign territories in the Indo-Pacific, France seeks to position its diplomacy not only as a national actor but also as a standard-bearer for European engagement in the region. The exercise of sovereignty is precisely what underpins France's specificity and credibility as a resident power. The French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs) – La Réunion, Mayotte, les TAAF (or South Antarctic Lands), New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton – which together have a population of 1.65 million inhabitants, play a central role in the construction and elaboration of a credible strategy. Notably, 93 percent of France's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) lies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, making it the second largest EEZ in the world after that of the United States. There are also around 200,000 French expats residing in countries of the region, more than 7,000 French subsidiary companies operating in the region, and 8,000 military personnel stationed permanently. The assimilation of the FIPOCs into a single geostrategic Indo-Pacific framework is a logical step for a state seeking to assert itself as a legitimate actor in the region. However, despite some common geographical, economic, and political characteristics, grouping the FIPOCs into a single macro-region does not fully reflect the diversity of contexts and geopolitical challenges specific to each territory. A comprehensive and nuanced understanding of local contexts is thus essential to fully comprehend the complexity of France's Indo-Pacific engagement. This series will explore each of the FIPOCs separately to understand their characteristics, role in France's Indo-Pacific strategy, and potential friction points between national and local drivers. You can view the full series here; today, we focus on French Polynesia. Encompassing five archipelagos and 118 islands, French Polynesia is a pivotal element of France's strategy in the Pacific. Its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), covering nearly 4.8 million square kilometers, accounts for almost half of the total French EEZ – which is the second largest globally. Beyond its maritime significance, French Polynesia offers a compelling case study of how post-colonial legacies, nuclear trauma, and political evolution have shaped a successful model of shared sovereignty within the French Republic. Colonial Imprint and Nuclear Legacy Eastern Polynesia was among the last regions on Earth to be explored and settled by humans. In the case of French Polynesia, archaeological evidence suggests an initial wave of settlement beginning around 800 CE in Tahiti, between 800 and 900 CE in the Marquesas and Gambier Islands, around 1000 CE in the Tuamotu atolls and the eastern parts of the Society Islands, and approximately 1100 CE in the Austral Islands. French influence began formally in 1842 with the establishment of a protectorate, in a context of heated rivalries between French and British colonial power in the region. The territory underwent a major transformation in the 1960s, when France established its Pacific Experimentation Center (CEP), triggering a wave of modernization – and deep trauma. Between 1966 and 1996, France conducted 193 nuclear tests, including 41 atmospheric and 152 underground at Moruroa and Fangataufa (Tuamotu archipelago). These experiments left lasting social and environmental scars. Although long taboo in Paris, the nuclear legacy has since entered public debate. The current political party in power, the pro-independence Tavini Huiraatira, has historically opposed nuclear testing and pushed for transparency and reparations. In 2010, a national law established a right to compensation for individuals recognized as victims of French nuclear testing. In a gesture of appeasement and openness, the French state granted access to the Moruroa site in March 2024 to a high-level Polynesian delegation, including President Moetai Brotherson, marking a shift from opacity to cautious transparency. The change is a rational response considering the evolving political dynamics between Paris and Papeete. Increased Autonomy French Polynesia's political evolution reflects France's gradual accommodation of demands for self-government. From a protectorate (1842–1880) to a colony (1880–1946), and then an overseas territory (1946–2003), the territory has undergone significant institutional transformations. Today, as an overseas collectivity, it enjoys broad autonomy, with its own laws and institutions – including a president, a government, and a parliament – managing key areas such as the budget, foreign investment, and resource exploitation. While sovereign competencies – such as national defense, justice, public order, internal security and currency issuance – remain under the authority of the French state and are implemented by the High Commissioner, foreign affairs may, in certain cases, be the subject of shared competence. A Quiet Model? French Polynesia represents a rare example of international agency of a non-state actor, as it holds formal membership in several interregional organizations, including the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Community, and the Polynesian Leaders Group. Successive presidents of French Polynesia have engaged in high-level meetings with foreign heads of state – a development that underscores the territory's growing diplomatic autonomy. This trend was exemplified by then-President Edouard Fritch's attendance at the first U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit in 2022, and Brotherson's visit in 2023 to Washington for the second summit, where he met with U.S. President Joe Biden. This ad hoc model of shared competences in foreign affairs can at times create ambiguity. While French Polynesia is at the forefront of France's Indo-Pacific ambitions, local voices – including Brotherson – have expressed skepticism about the wider strategy. But this ad hoc relationship often functions harmoniously, as French presidents have repeatedly associated their counterparts from French Polynesia in the France-Oceania Summits, and even during presidential trips abroad, such as President Macron's visit to Vanuatu in 2023. Despite the enduring legacies of sensitive issues, including the public health consequences of nuclear testing, French Polynesia offers a relatively stable model of negotiated autonomy within the French constitutional order. The most recent example came when Brotherson and French President Emmanuel Macron jointly announced at the U.N. Ocean Conference in Nice that nearly the entire EEZ of the archipelago – 4.55 million sq km, or 47 percent of France's EEZ – would be designated as a Marine Protected Area (MPA), in a mutually beneficial act of environmental diplomacy. Shared sovereignty in French Polynesia diverges from the impasse faced by New Caledonia, suggesting that calibrated devolution and respectful partnership can reconcile historical grievances while maintaining continued political association.
The Diplomat
5 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Afghanistan Has a Lot at Stake in the Iran Conflict
From a massive refugee population to a major trade partner, Iran is of crucial importance to the Taliban regime. The U.S. should pay attention to the growing relationship. Mahnoor Naimi recorded her latest vlog on June 22. She asked her viewers to pray for her, and to forgive her, if she didn't make it home. She said she was stuck in Iran. Speaking from the Sang-e Safid camp, near the border between Iran and Afghanistan, the Afghan YouTuber – likely in her mid-20s – appeared weary, but composed. In the video, posted on the same day the United States dropped bombs on Iranian nuclear facilities (and then reposted to her channel a few days later), Naimi said she just wanted to go home to Afghanistan. About a year ago, she left Afghanistan and went to Tehran looking for work. Since then, she has lived in various cities across Iran, trying to build a life. She has shared her journey through videos posted on YouTube. In one of her vlogs, she shared that she worked at a clothing factory, sewing garments. Back in 2021, as the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, reportedly more than a million Afghans fled to Iran for a variety of reasons. But as the war between Israel and Iran heated up, Naimi – and many others – decided it's time to come back. The bombings weren't the only factor. In recent months, Iranian authorities have been rounding up Afghan refugees, transferring them to deportation camps near the Iran-Afghanistan border. Human Rights Watch has described the camps as 'veritable prisons.' Reports of harassment, violence, and even torture at the hands of Iranian officials have continuously emerged from Afghans held in these sites. And that was before the war. Naimi, in her post on June 22, spoke carefully so as not to provoke Iranian audiences. She described the heartbreaking scenes around her: hungry children, frail men and women searching desperately for a piece of bread, and families living in misery. Weeping, she said that more than anything, she wants to return home. 'Whatever Afghanistan is, it is ours. It is our country,' she said in the video. Despite the war unfolding just across its western border, life in Afghanistan remained strikingly calm. One might have expected panic in Kabul, especially given the fragile state of its economy. Yet, remarkably, there has been little visible disruption. Contrary to widespread expectations, the Taliban have refrained from taking a strong public stance on the conflict. The leadership has avoided broad or inflammatory statements – neither issuing loud condemnations of Israel nor showing extraordinary support for Iran. Instead, they have adopted a calculated, restrained posture, one that appears aimed at avoiding entanglement in the broader regional conflict. Since the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, the group has faced widespread international condemnation and diplomatic isolation. Amid widespread concerns over human rights abuses, particularly against women and minorities, no country has formally recognized the Taliban government. Economic sanctions, the freezing of Afghanistan's central bank assets, and restrictions on foreign aid have further strained the country's fragile economy. That may be why the Taliban appear to be proceeding with caution amid the backdrop of a highly volatile Middle East. The Taliban have previously expressed a desire to normalize relations with the international community, particularly the United States, even if primarily driven by their own interests. That may explain why, during the recent conflict between Israel and Iran, the de facto government demonstrated an unexpected level of restraint. A brief statement issued on June 21 – the day before the U.S. strikes on Iran – outlined a meeting between Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Iran's ambassador in Kabul. In the statement, Muttaqi condemned Israel's attacks on Iran, calling them a clear violation of international law, and expressed solidarity with the Iranian people. Yet there have been no mass protests in Afghanistan. No Israeli flags have been burned; no anti-American slogans have been heard. The Taliban's restrained response to the Israel-Iran conflict stands in contrast to the approach taken by some officials during the former U.S.-backed Republic. In 2017, then-Deputy Chief Executive Mohammad Mohaqiq publicly praised and thanked Iranian General Qassem Soleimani – who was later killed in a U.S. airstrike – for his role in forming the Fatemiyoun Brigade, a militia composed of Afghan refugees recruited by Iran to fight in Syria. Mohaqiq's remarks, which also endorsed Iran's efforts to mobilize Afghan fighters, reflected the extent of Tehran's influence even within the leadership of a government established by the United States. The Taliban's current approach toward Iran takes place in a different context. Today, Iran – despite its own constrained circumstances – serves as a pivotal economic lifeline for Afghanistan. The U.N. refugee agency, UNHCR, estimates that nearly 4.5 million Afghan nationals live in Iran, 71 percent of whom are women and children. Other sources suggest the actual number may be even higher. In recent years, Iran has deported thousands of Afghans – a process that only intensified amid the escalating war with Israel. If Iran continues with mass deportations of Afghans, it will exacerbate Afghanistan's existing economic hardships. According to Naimi's vlog, Afghans she met in the camp 'are so vulnerable that it is hard to describe in words.' She noted that the Afghans would urgently need shelter, employment, and food upon arriving in Afghanistan. Yet food and jobs are precisely what Afghanistan cannot offer. The United Nations reported this week that the Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan has received only 18 percent of its required funding as of June 19, severely disrupting aid delivery to millions – including women, children, returnees, refugees, displaced communities, and other vulnerable groups. Reportedly, the Taliban have struggled even to pay their own rank and file. Creating new employment opportunities is hardly expected from an unrecognized regime ruling a landlocked country facing drought and burdened by heavy sanctions. Now, couple the refugee crisis with Afghanistan's heavy reliance on trade with Iran, and the fragility of the country's situation becomes even more apparent. Here, the potential fallout of regional war becomes impossible to ignore. In 2024, both Iranian and Afghan officials highlighted the growing economic ties between the two countries, with some claiming that annual trade had reached billions. According to Afghanistan's TOLO News, official figures from Afghanistan's Ministry of Industry and Commerce indicated that bilateral trade in the first nine months of 2024 totaled $2.2 billion – $2.2 billion in imports and only $38 million in exports. The bulk of Afghan imports from Iran consisted of diesel, petrol, and natural gas. Given the heavy international sanctions on Iran – particularly targeting its oil and gas sector – such exports to Afghanistan provide Tehran with a critical economic outlet and a rare source of foreign currency. Heavily sanctioned itself, Afghanistan has little choice but to rely on Iran's oil and gas – an uneasy dependence that forges ties born out of necessity rather than genuine alliance. After investing two decades of effort and resources, the United States now appears to be allowing Afghanistan to fall into the sphere of Iran, a regional rival and adversary. For now, the Taliban's relatively measured approach to the Iran-Israel conflict reflects their lingering hope to forge some level of ties with Washington. But if Taliban leaders eventually give up those efforts, a full-fledged embrace of Iran could follow. This is not merely about leaving Afghanistan trapped in the misery of sanctions – allowing Iran to gain influence represents a strategic setback for the United States after pouring blood and billions into the country. It raises urgent questions about the true cost of the United States' longest war and the enduring consequences of its withdrawal, if Afghanistan drifts further into the orbit of a heavily sanctioned regional adversary. The rights of millions of Afghan girls and women like Mahnoor Naimi – to work, to receive an education, and to live with dignity in their own country – should never be up for negotiation. Still, the tentative ceasefire with Iran – and the prospect of a weakened regime in Tehran – may offer the United States an opportunity to rethink its approach to Afghanistan and pursue a path of calculated, diplomatic engagement. Absent meaningful engagement, a destabilized Afghanistan – fraught with desperation, isolation, and volatility – risks becoming a nexus of renewed extremism and proxy conflicts that the United States and its allies cannot afford to disregard. This does not imply that the U.S. should endorsed the Taliban, nor empower a regime widely condemned for systemic gender-based oppression. Rather, it reflects a sober recognition of the complex and enduring realities on the ground: to forgo engagement with the de facto authorities is to abandon millions of Afghans like Naimi, who are caught in an intensifying humanitarian and political crisis. Persisting with sanctions in the absence of dialogue threatens only to exacerbate their suffering. Without urgent intervention, the lives of Naimi and millions of Afghan men, women, and children – who remain, by choice or circumstance, unable to flee – hang precariously by a thread.
The Diplomat
6 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Japan's WWII Anniversary Strategy and China's Memory Politics
The historical issues in East Asia have long been a blindspot for the United States. Time to start paying attention. As Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru prepares for the 80th anniversary of Japan's surrender in World War II this August, the United States must, for the first time, fully recognize and respond to the geopolitical implications underpinning these commemorative cycles. While Washington tends to dismiss these disputes as political theater secondary to power politics, Beijing continues its decades-long campaign of systematically collecting, digitizing, and analyzing Japanese wartime records and military writings. This historical infrastructure provides insights into Tokyo's postwar defense establishment, reinforces China's broader nationalistic narrative, and expands Beijing's regional interests – yet Washington fails to recognize the full extent to which China weaponizes historical narratives in order to isolate Japan and weaken U.S. alliances and partnerships across Asia. As Tokyo's role in the Indo-Pacific evolves, Washington's assumption that Japan – constitutionally restricted from maintaining military forces and shaped by decades of antimilitarist constraints and pacifist public sentiment – is fundamentally divorced from its pre-1945 strategic tradition creates dangerous vulnerabilities for alliance management and regional strategy. These vulnerabilities demand a new strategy and vigorous diplomatic effort. Misreading History in the China-Japan Rivalry These strategic vulnerabilities have deep roots. During the 1990s, bilateral security trends between Japan and China received relatively little attention. The general absence of major bilateral disputes or direct military confrontation during this period – combined with the fact that the Japan-U.S. alliance itself has often obscured Japan's own security posture, sometimes deliberately, by serving as both a buffer and interpretive lens for regional dynamics – can partially explain this lack of analytical focus. Yet underlying Sino-Japanese pressure persisted in what Japanese analysts would later describe as a state of sustained 'low altitude flight' (teikū hikō) based on confrontation and distrust. While the late 20th century neglect was perhaps understandable, this analytical blind spot's endurance cannot be justified. This period of sustained tensions was punctuated by insufficient U.S. responses to Japan's history problems. During the 2005 textbook controversy, when China erupted in massive anti-Japanese protests over textbook revisions minimizing Japanese wartime atrocities, official U.S. attempts at intervention failed to effectively intermediate. Recurring disputes over Japanese leaders' visits to Yasukuni Shrine – which controversially honors convicted war criminals alongside Japan's war dead – exemplified the United States' diplomatic limitations. Washington, for example, could muster only tepid diplomatic 'disappointment' when Prime Minister Abe Shinzo proceeded with his own controversial visit despite high level appeals from the Obama administration in 2013. In the 'comfort women' dispute, Japan's controversial approach to its own wartime responsibility for sexual slavery in Korea remains largely unresolved. U.S. pressure for a quick diplomatic resolution – the 2015 Japan-South Korea agreement – alienated survivors and triggered diplomatic backlash that undermined the accord's implementation. These and other recurring tensions and missteps, persisting despite U.S. intervention and Japanese concessions, reveal a deeper challenge: the inability of U.S. policymakers to fully recognize the drivers of such regional strain. Washington's mismanagement culminated in its response to Abe's August 2015 statement marking Japan's 70th surrender anniversary. While Abe had publicly pledged during his April 2015 U.S. visit to uphold the 1993 Kono Statement officially apologizing to comfort women, his August assertion that future generations shouldn't be 'predestined to apologize' signaled a shift in Japan's approach. U.S. officials responded positively to Abe's statement, despite predictable regional fallout with Japan's neighbors. This diplomatic misstep undermined trilateral security coordination precisely when North Korean threats and Chinese incursions demanded it. As Ishiba prepares to navigate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, he now inherits this decades-long challenge. Ishiba's Anniversary Strategy As early as January 2025, Ishiba recognized the 80th anniversary as a predominant challenge of his early tenure, despite fumbling and recently recovering approval ratings. He has proposed an expert panel to examine the war's origins. This approach allows him to sidestep a formal Cabinet statement and instead minimize personal association with the issue by issuing a message to the public based on the findings of this panel. Ishiba's April 2025 visit to the Philippines War Memorial revealed the uneasiness in his approach. His observation that 'they haven't forgotten' Japan's wartime actions acknowledges regional wounds that persist eight decades later. Yet his government's proposed war panel appears to analyze primarily procedural questions and policy failures – what Komeito party leader Saito Tetsuo described as examining 'why Japan plunged into a war where many died and why it couldn't be stopped' – not moral responsibility. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian, in contrast, demanded that Japan 'deeply reflect on its historical guilt' while citing Ishiba's November 2024 pledge to 'look to the future, facing history squarely.' Beijing commands this gap between acknowledging history and accepting guilt – and it will maintain this territory regardless of Tokyo's approach. What Japan has traditionally treated as diplomacy, China wields as strategy. Yet Ishiba's strategy seems to further break a pattern set by his predecessors. Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi's 1995 statement at the 50th anniversary established a template of expressing 'deep remorse' and 'heartfelt apology' for Japan's wartime aggression – language that Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro maintained at the 60th anniversary in 2005. Ten years later, Abe's 2015 approach marked a sea change in this cycle, emphasizing instead Japan's evolving international role while attempting to curtail the cycle of apology. Ishiba's focus, in contrast, appears to be on process and examining wartime decision-making rather than addressing moral culpability, which positions him farther from Murayama's acceptance of guilt and closer to the strategic autonomy that has emerged from Japan's expanding security leadership in the Indo-Pacific under Abe's vision. Yet, importantly, behind Ishiba's mask of analytical neutrality lies a drift in Japan's grand strategy: nationalist narratives muted by procedural distance, quietly assuming Japanese leadership as U.S. power recedes – a shift that helps explain Beijing's efforts at controlling international narratives. Beijing's Memory Politics While Japan crafts new narratives of regional leadership, China has spent decades building the historical arsenal to counter them – translating, studying, and cataloging Japanese war materials that serve Beijing's strategic objectives regardless of Tokyo's diplomatic approach. For Beijing, mastering historical narratives stands equal to technological and economic dominance in securing China's rise to great power status – a strategy evidenced by the Chinese Ministry of State Security's 2021 analysis 'National Security and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers.' This document shows that China studies Japan's path from wartime collapse to postwar growth to map its own rise and navigate around avoidable pitfalls while undermining Tokyo's current position. Beijing does this not to settle scores, but to amplify its own advantages – a game Tokyo is only recently learning to play. Beijing's systematic preservation of wartime records is worth understanding because it both exemplifies China's priorities and serves its strategic intelligence needs – monitoring what officials like Senior Colonel Wu Qian, director general of the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense, describe as the lingering 'specter of militarism' in Japan's modern defense posture. China leverages this strategy to both elevate its own great power status while creating a self-reinforcing internal narrative focused on historical justice and national resurgence. Institutionalizing China's Historical Infrastructure Marshal Xu Xiangqian's 1979 speech at the Central Military Commission symposium established an institutional mandate that defined China's historical intelligence apparatus. One of his core directives required Chinese military cadres to study foreign histories of World War II to prepare for modern warfare, explicitly linking historical analysis with strategic advantage. This high-level mandate stimulated a major research effort by Chinese military education institutions and civilian universities to translate and analyze works of Japanese strategic and military thought. From approximately 1980 to 2010, Chinese academies published over 700 translations of foreign military texts on World War II, while institutions including the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Academy of Military Science, and the National Defense University began offering graduate degrees in military history. This translation infrastructure grants Chinese military decisionmakers what Ma Jun of the Chinese National Defense University called a 'rich knowledge of historical studies, and a strong ability to draw insights.' Meanwhile, such foundational Japanese military thought and historical documents are largely unknown and inaccessible to Japan's English-speaking allies. Further, China operationalizes its memory politics through memorial institutions, legal documentation, and strategic research, then deploys this historical knowledge through not just military training but confrontational diplomacy and coordinated public narratives. The Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall exemplifies Beijing's public approach, gradually transforming since its establishment in 1985 from memorialization into a celebration of 'national rejuvenation' under Xi Jinping. Beijing has long weaponized the facility's presence, including recently introducing new documentary evidence of Japanese atrocities, and maintains its international visibility and access to transform historical preservation into political leverage. Beijing applies the same strategic historiography to the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. Treatment of these proceedings remained largely neglected until China began entrenching its own historical interpretation of the trials. In 2011, Shanghai Jiao Tong University established a Center for the Tokyo Trial Studies, readily surpassing any similar institution in Japan or elsewhere internationally. The center collects, translates, and publishes Tribunal documents from the 1940s, making them widely available online. Most notably, during heightened tensions over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial disputes in 2016, the center launched one of the world's most comprehensive, multilingual online depositories of trial records and evidence to date. As just these few significant examples aptly demonstrate, Beijing has spent decades learning to read and weaponize Japan's strategic identity and history while Washington barely grasps how its ally thinks, much less where it's heading. Conclusion The knowledge asymmetry between the United States and China – compounded by Washington's failure to recognize Japan's own evolving grand strategy – creates three immediate vulnerabilities for U.S. strategy in Asia. First, it erodes effective alliance management when Japanese security decisions and postures are interpreted differently by U.S. and Chinese officials, creating the potential for dangerous misalignment during crises. Second, it risks undermining Japan's leadership ambitions while ceding narrative advantage to Beijing in multilateral fora where historical context shapes regional receptiveness to competing security frameworks. Third, it leaves Washington both ill-equipped to counter Chinese political offensives that strategically weaponize historical Sino-Japanese grievances and inclined to prioritize short-term alliance goals over addressing deeper historical tensions, U.S. retrenchment, or broader strategic evolutions in the region. Beijing's historical memory politics will test these vulnerabilities as Ishiba navigates the upcoming 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. While China's decades of strategic preparation provide significant advantages, Washington can still address these asymmetries through targeted policy adjustments. Most fundamentally, the United States must demonstrate sustained commitment to alliance management with Japan through both concrete actions and public statements that reassure Tokyo of Washington's staying power. Only then must the United States and Japan develop integrated intelligence capabilities to counter Beijing, creating bilateral initiatives that challenge China's monopoly on interpreting Japanese strategic thought for regional audiences while building U.S. expertise. Washington, alongside Tokyo, must anticipate and prepare for Beijing's historical offensives, developing proactive anniversary strategies and multilateral coordination mechanisms that prevent China from exploiting commemorative cycles to drive wedges between the United States and Japan. U.S. retreat increasingly drives Japan toward autonomy, if not outright isolation. Without reform, Beijing will exploit this upcoming anniversary to accelerate that drift while Washington will remain blind to what drives apart one of its most important Asian alliances.
