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The Diplomat
3 hours ago
- Business
- The Diplomat
Southeast Asia's Uneven Tourism Recovery, Explained
If we look back to the time before the COVID-19 pandemic brought international travel to a halt, tourism across Southeast Asia was absolutely booming. The six major markets (Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia) attracted more than 127 million foreign tourists in 2019. Of these, Thailand was far and away the leader with nearly 40 million. Two years later, during the thick of global lockdowns, the figure dropped to 2.6 million. Since then, tourism in the region has been on a slow road to recovery, but even now has yet to regain those 2019 pre-pandemic heights. In 2024, the same six markets combined for 114 million tourist visits, roughly 89 percent of 2019 levels. And there are indications that the recovery is slowing, especially in certain markets. The Philippines has consistently struggled to attract visitors since the pandemic. The country was not a huge tourism draw to begin with, bringing in around 8 million visitors in 2019, even when the region as a whole was booming. Last year, inbound travelers were clocked at 5.4 million, just 66 percent of their pre-pandemic level. Thailand remains the regional leader with 35.5 million inbound tourists in 2024. But despite the big headline figure, the outlook is not great. As of June 2025, arrivals were roughly 5 percent lower than they were at the same time last year. That means unless it finishes the year with a big surge, Thailand is currently on pace to see fewer tourists than it did in 2024. At this rate, surpassing the pre-pandemic threshold of 40 million could take a while. Other markets are seeing more sustained recoveries, though they still fall short of pre-pandemic levels. Singapore is currently on track to slightly improve from the 16.5 million tourists who arrived in 2024. And Indonesia continues to see a steady recovery, with 13.9 million arrivals in 2024. As of June 2025, this was 9 percent ahead of last year's pace and the country looks set to exceed 14 million arrivals this year. To put that into perspective, 14 million was the number of tourists that visited Indonesia in 2017, a full eight years ago. Malaysia is almost back to pre-pandemic numbers with 25 million tourist arrivals in 2024, just below the 26 million they saw in 2019. If we include excursionists (visitors who come for the day but don't spend the night), that figure jumps up to 38 million, meaning Malaysia is actually ahead of Thailand in raw visitor traffic. But Malaysia is a bit of a special case in this regard, as many Singaporeans cross the border during the day for a variety of reasons (work, day trips, etc), but aren't really what we have in mind when talking about international tourist flows. Finally, Vietnam is a very interesting story to watch here. Before COVID-19, Vietnam saw 18 million inbound tourists. Last year, it was at 17.5 million, 98 percent of the pre-pandemic level. As of June 2025, more than 10 million tourists had entered the country, putting the country on pace to blow past the 2019 figure. Remarkably, this boom is being driven primarily by two countries: South Korea and China. Together they accounted for 8.3 million, or just under half, of all visitors last year. Clearly, there is substantial variation in terms of the pace and drivers of tourism recovery across the region. Some markets are bouncing back strongly, others more slowly. Making sense of this is complicated by the fact that tourism plays a different role in each national economy. For economies that are heavily reliant on exports, like Thailand and Vietnam, a strong recovery in tourism (which is a service export) is essential for economic stability. Even though Thailand is posting big headline figures of around 35 million arrivals, the fact that visitor numbers still haven't reached 2019 levels and seem to be weakening is not good news, given the challenges facing the Thai economy right now. Vietnam, meanwhile, appears to be rapidly catching up as the region's next big powerhouse exporter, not just of goods but also of services. For Indonesia, a modest recovery that takes a long time to return to 2019 levels could potentially be a good thing. Inbound tourism in Indonesia is heavily concentrated in and around Bali, and is linked to a range of problems like resource depletion, over-development, pollution and so forth. A more measured recovery allows time, if used wisely, for the industry to adjust to the influx of visitors and the strains that come with it. The breakneck pace of tourism growth in Vietnam, on the other hand, while good for the country's export-led style of economic development, will place considerable pressure on businesses, regulators and planners to keep up.
The Diplomat
3 hours ago
- Business
- The Diplomat
ASEAN and Trump's Tariffs: Regional Calamity, Rent Seeking, or Return to the Status Quo?
On April 2, President Donald Trump threw financial markets into turmoil when he announced his 'liberation day' tariffs, which looked set to upend world trade and reverse decades of globalization. He quickly backpedaled, pausing the tariffs for 90 days in order to allow trade negotiations with the affected nations. Among the most heavily tariffed nations were many members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Cambodia, which was hit with a tariff of 49 percent, Laos (48 percent), Vietnam (46 percent), Myanmar (44 percent), and Thailand (36 percent). On July 8, with negotiations stalling, Trump sent out 14 tariff letters to many leaders informing them of 'new tariff lines' if they did not hurry up and settle trade deals by August 1. This quickly focused the minds and attention of the region's leaders, who rushed to negotiate with Washington in the hope of avoiding economy-crippling tariffs. After Trump's initial tariff announcement in April, ASEAN leaders were understandably concerned about the unilateral American tariffs and the possible wide-ranging negative impacts they would have on their export-based economies. On July 3, Vietnam became the first ASEAN country to secure a deal with the U.S., gaining a reduction in its tariff to 20 percent. Indonesia and the Philippines secured their deals in late July, each getting tariffed at 'only' 19 percent. This left Thailand and others in the region understandably angry at their own governments for not yet finalizing deals. When the August 1 deadline arrived, news of 'final' tariff lines was quick to calm the fears of governments and publics across the region. Laos, Myanmar, and Brunei were the only ASEAN countries that did not see threatened tariffs reduced significantly, receiving tariffs of 40 percent in the case of Laos and Myanmar, and 25 percent in the case of Brunei. Nor have there been any expressions of concern from these countries, for whom the U.S. is a relatively minor export market. Brunei's top 3 export partners are Australia, which accounts for 22 percent of its total exports, Singapore (17 percent), and China (17 percent), with the U.S. taking less than 1 percent. Likewise, Laos's top 3 export partners are China (42 percent), Vietnam (22 percent), and Thailand (14 percent), with the U.S. making up just 1.8 percent. Myanmar's top 3 export partners are China (23 percent), Thailand (20 percent), and India (8.6 percent), with the U.S. taking just 3.2 percent. Simply put, Trump and America do not matter much in economic terms to these three ASEAN countries. The final tariffs, as posted on August 1, essentially return most ASEAN member states back to the status quo ante of April 1. Aside from the above states and Singapore, which has been hit with just the 10 percent 'baseline' tariff, all other members are within percentage margins of one another. From a macro view, this will have a very limited impact on the relative competitiveness of these nations' export industries. This is not to say there will not be supply chain disruption and possible rises in prices for goods going both ways, as some products are re-exported to Southeast Asia from the U.S. via corporate supply chains. However, this should be the exception rather than the rule. When one digs further into Trump's tariff exemptions, a richer picture emerges. Annex II of his executive order includes a massive list of product exemptions. Those goods exempted include electronics, pharmaceuticals, smartphones, lumber, computers, integrated circuitry (including semiconductors, mineral and derivative refined ores (including copper and nickel), rubber, chemicals, including aromatics, fuel oils, various forms of oil derivatives and byproducts including fatty vegetable oils. Many of these are among ASEAN nations' top five exports to the United States. A straightforward way to understand these exemptions is that these are products America cannot produce or cannot be sourced elsewhere. This, of course, is to keep the American market and consumer from feeling the pinch of aggravated inflation, noticeable shortages of goods, or shortages needed for American industry. For the time being, Southeast Asian nations have been spared their worst fears. This does not mean that ASEAN economies are safe or that the region's biggest economies with significant export exposure to the American market will not be affected. Machine tools, automobiles, steel, aluminum, processed foods, and other important exports are all subject to the tariff rise. Additionally, Japan and South Korea, which can and do produce similar products, are now subject to substantially lower tariffs of 15 percent, and their industries can rapidly retool for production shifts away from Southeast Asia. The degree of impact is not yet known as the tariffs have only just gone into effect. A major point of contention and focus for the Trump administration was, and is, trade diversion: namely, goods exported from China to Southeast Asia, which are relabeled, rebranded, have slight value added, or are simply provided with fraudulent paperwork to deceive U.S. customs agents as to their origins. It is known that part of the tariff deals with Southeast Asian governments has been an insistence on cracking down on the transshipment of goods to the American market, i.e., goods from China. It is rumored that the U.S. could set regional or content origin requirements as high as 50 percent, meaning that half of the final product's value must be added in the country subject to import tariffs. This is designed to disrupt Chinese industrial and corporate supply chains and deal with product transshipment. The Trump administration's method for dealing with transshipment is to impose a 40% import tariff if customs officials deem a product to be transshipped or not in compliance with content origin rules. This is forcing some ASEAN states to reorganize their regulatory methods, with Malaysia no longer allowing chambers of commerce to issue certificates of origin. Similar moves and restructuring will be seen across ASEAN in the very near future. The problem with current content origin rules is that there is a lack of certainty as to the exact formulation and percentage or local content required. There is no defined and published formula for how much content from China or how much value-added processing will be allowed before transshipment tariffs apply. This, of course, creates massive uncertainty for business and points to a lack of clear and uniform strategy from the Trump administration. However, with transshipment, one can assume that there will be a single unified formula applied globally. If not, businesses will simply reorient to the lowest-cost and most feasible jurisdiction, as they did after the first Trump administration's imposition of tariffs on China in 2018. The Trump administration can go broad and try to punish China-based businesses, which will lead to significant supply chain disruption, reorganization, and the likely movement of some production out of China. The second option is a narrow application designed to do away with small value add, relabeling, and the like, which will lead to minor disruptions to the status quo. Which way the administration breaks depends on its intent to harm Chinese business while mitigating noticeable effects to American consumers. In addition to the uncertainty surrounding transshipment rules is Trump's continuously shifting policy. On August 7, the day before the tariffs were set to come into force, the U.S. president announced that he would now levy a 100 percent tariff on semiconductor imports. Major producers such as South Korea had already secured exemption of semiconductors as part of their 'deal.' It can be assumed that Southeast Asian governments secured product line-specific carve-outs similar to South Korea rather than depending on the vagaries of Trump's executive order, which subjected exemptions in accordance with Section 232 national security investigations. Trump managed to leverage American economic and trade power against ASEAN states by setting sky-high initial tariff threats, engaging in bilateral negotiations, and using compressed time frame tactics to gain beneficial outcomes. Nearly all ASEAN countries that cut deals within the August 1 deadline, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, agreed to large purchases of U.S. goods, including Boeing planes and liquefied natural gas (LNG), designed to reduce the size of their trade surpluses with the U.S. On the surface, this appears to be a major win for certain American industries. However, Boeing currently has an order backlog of over a decade, while its 737 Max, which Cambodia, Malaysia and Indonesia have promised to purchase, is still grounded by the FAA due to its deadly flight safety record. LNG was also a major sell for ASEAN states in the trade negotiations. However, LNG production is nearing maximum capacity in the U.S., with new export production of 11 billion cubic meters coming online in 2028. Given that the European Union is reportedly going to buy €750 billion in LNG over the coming decade, a big question is whether these LNG deals are real or a form of performative statecraft designed to placate Trump. The laws of physics and markets at present and in the near future simply do not equate to America being able to increase LNG production to meet all these trade deals. Put simply, on paper, Trump's transactionalism sounds great, but the delivery timelines of the promised Boeing planes and LNG will stretch far beyond Trump's presidency, by which point they might well be canceled or renegotiated. Initial economic analysis predicts that the current tariff regime could reduce Thailand's GDP by 0.44 percent, Vietnam's by 0.33 percent, and Indonesia's by 0.11 percent, reflecting their different industry-specific tariff lines and exemptions. However, preliminary economic forecasts can only be speculative, given the lack of certainty around rules and enforcement. These forecasts also do not take into account Southeast Asian government measures aimed at stabilizing industries, such as export subsidies, and other policy responses that are certain to materialize. Thailand has already set aside 20 billion baht ($618 million) for the support of affected industries, and other governments are likely to follow suit in order to secure their economic interests. President Trump has managed to rearrange relations with ASEAN states and has successfully made most Southeast Asian leaders 'kiss my ass.' However, his heavy-handed tactics have touched raw nerves with leaders and publics in the region. Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen articulated the regional sentiment when he stated during this year's Munich Security Conference that the U.S. was now behaving like a 'landlord seeking rent,' bringing into question American steadfastness and Washington's commitment to the region. That remark was made prior to Trump's initial tariff announcement; the past few months have likely only reinforced these views. The president has also delinked trade from security partnerships, altering a hallmark of previous foreign policy. It appears that only Singapore received significant benefits from being a close U.S. security partner, although this was possibly the result of its trade deficit with Washington. As existing relationships have been brought into question and economic pressure builds, Southeast Asian leaders need to grasp the opportunity to deepen trade ties through the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, unlock the ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement, and provide industry support for supply chain ownership in ASEAN states.
The Diplomat
3 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Censored Thai Exhibition Undermined ‘Core Interests,' China Claims
A detail from the poster advertising the 'Constellation of Complicity' exhibition, which opened on July 24 at the Bangkok Art and Culture Center in Bangkok, Thailand. China's government has accused the organizers of an exhibition in Thailand of undermining its 'core interests,' after the publication of a report that the show's co-curator removed and altered artworks at the request of the Chinese embassy in Bangkok. The Reuters news agency reported last week that the Bangkok Art and Culture Center (BACC) had removed materials about China's treatment of ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang and its policy toward Hong Kong from an exhibition featuring artists from authoritarian nations. In a written response to Reuters yesterday, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that the exhibition 'promoted the fallacies of so-called 'Tibetan independence', 'the East Turkestan Islamic Movement' and 'Hong Kong independence',' distorted China's policies and 'undermined China's core interests and political dignity.' The exhibit, titled 'Constellation of Complicity: Visualizing the Global Machinery of Authoritarian Solidarity,' opened at the BACC on July 24. According to the center's website, it features artworks from Myanmar, Iran, Russia, Syria, the diaspora community, and 'regions with cultural and autonomy demands.' It said that the exhibition sought to interrogate the 'formal and informal alignments between authoritarian states through the lens of artists who have lived through – or in exile from – their consequences.' Reuters' report quoted Sai, an artist from Myanmar who has co-curated the exhibition, as saying that three days after the show opened, Chinese embassy staff, accompanied by Bangkok city officials, 'entered the exhibition and demanded its shutdown.' The news agency also quoted an email dated July 30 in which BACC said: 'Due to pressure from the Chinese Embassy – transmitted through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and particularly the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, our main supporter – we have been warned that the exhibition may risk creating diplomatic tensions between Thailand and China.' The email said the gallery had 'no choice but to make certain adjustments.' According to a report by Khaosod English, China was originally included in the list of repressive countries, but the word had been covered with black tape, 'both in the Thai and English descriptions of the exhibition.' It quoted Sai as saying that the names and regional affiliations of three artists, from Hong Kong, Tibet, and the Uyghur diaspora, had been 'covered with black tape,' while the Tibetan and Uyghur flags in one installation were removed. 'Later, all of Tibetan artist Tenzin Mingyur Paldron's video works were taken down, and postcards referencing Xi Jinping and a book were removed,' he added. 'It is tragically ironic that an exhibition on authoritarian cooperation has been censored under authoritarian pressure,' Sai told Reuters. 'Thailand has long been a refuge for dissidents. This is a chilling signal to all exiled artists and activists in the region.' Sai reportedly fled abroad after Thai police sought to find him. The censorship of the exhibition is a sign of Beijing's willingness to leverage its diplomatic clout to prevent the expression of criticism of Chinese policies, whether by Chinese nationals or foreigners. Indeed, it is just the latest in a line of Chinese attempts to shut down film screenings, exhibitions, and other cultural events abroad. In 2009, Beijing demanded that the Palm Springs International Film Festival withdraw two China-related films; the same year, Chinese hackers attacked the website of the Melbourne International Film Festival over its decision to screen a documentary about the exiled Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer. In both cases, the organizers refused, after which Chinese films were subsequently pulled from the festival line-ups, apparently under Chinese government pressure. Similarly, in July of this year, Chinese officials sought to halt the initial screening of the Philippine film 'Food Delivery: Fresh From The West Philippine Sea,' which details the experiences of Filipino troops and fishermen facing Chinese pressure in the South China Sea. According to its makers, the film was quietly dropped from the roster of the PureGold CinePanalo Film Festival due to what its organizers described as 'external factors.' (The filmmakers later moved to an alternative venue.) Chinese diplomats also attempted – unsuccessfully – to have 'Food Delivery' removed from a film festival in New Zealand. According to correspondence seen by the New Zealand press, the Chinese Consulate in Auckland said that the documentary 'is rife with disinformation and false propaganda, serving as a political tool for Philippines to pursue illegitimate claims in the South China Sea. Its screening would severely mislead the public and send the wrong message internationally.' In many of these past cases, festival organizers and gallery owners have refused to accede to Chinese requests to withdraw films or censor artworks. According to Sai, BACC also 'never wanted to censor' the 'Constellation of Complicity' exhibition and 'showed remarkable courage and professionalism in resisting repeated demands from the Chinese Embassy.' But the reported participation of the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority in the enforcement of the exhibition's censorship sends a worrying sign of Thailand's shrinking commitment to freedom of expression – and raises fears that close Thailand-China relations will exact a cost on the Thai creative community.
The Diplomat
3 hours ago
- Business
- The Diplomat
How India Could Capitalize on Trump's Trade Moves
This is an opportunity for New Delhi to make strategic choices that don't compromise its national interests, and to showcase its commitment to strategic autonomy. On August 6, U.S. President Donald Trump announced an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian goods, citing New Delhi's 'direct or indirect importation of Russian Federation oil.' India's purchases 'undermine U.S. efforts to counter Russia's harmful activities…. necessitating stronger measures to address the national emergency,' the statement said. It follows Trump's decision to impose a 25 percent 'reciprocal tariff' on Indian imports to the U.S., which took effect on August 7. Together with the new import tax, effective August 27, duties on some Indian exports will be as high as 50 percent — among the highest levied on any U.S. trading partner. Following the announcement, India's Ministry of External Affairs released a strongly worded statement describing the actions as 'unfair, unjustified and unreasonable.' New Delhi said it would take 'all actions necessary to protect its national interests.' Last week, in response to Trump's allegations that India was 'not only buying massive amounts of Russian Oil… (but also) selling it on the open market for big profits,' New Delhi issued a strong statement highlighting how after the 'commencement of the Ukraine conflict…. the United States at that time actively encouraged such (oil) imports…for strengthening global energy markets stability.' When Trump was sworn in as president, there was optimism in New Delhi that India-U.S. relations would soar, given the great personal rapport between India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump, which was on display during the latter's first term. In fact, Modi was one of the first global leaders to be hosted by Trump in his second term. However, more recent developments, notably the conflicting messaging over Trump's role as a mediator in the India-Pakistan crisis in May this year, and Washington's re-hyphenation of New Delhi and Islamabad, has significantly strained India-U.S. ties. Besides hurting trade with India, Trump's tariffs are expected to cause a serious setback to the India-U.S. partnership. Reports suggest that New Delhi has already put on hold new weapons and aircraft procurement plans from the United States, although India's Ministry of Defense has officially denied this. While New Delhi has so far not announced any action against the U.S. for its tariffs, its moves following the announcement are significant. Instead of caving in to Washington's pressure, New Delhi has opted to double down on its ties with Russia. Just a day after Trump's tariff announcement, India's National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to prepare for the latter's visit to India. Doval hailed the 'strategic and special partnership' with Russia during a 'tumultuous situation' in the world. The following day, Modi spoke with Putin and both sides reaffirmed their commitment to deepen the 'Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.' New Delhi also seems to be focusing on a diplomatic outreach to East Asia, with Modi set to visit Japan and China later this month. With India-U.S. tensions expected to spill over to multilateral platforms, such as the Quad grouping (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), Modi's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru signals that India's ties with Japan at the bilateral level will remain unaffected. Modi's in-person participation at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, his first since 2022, indicates that New Delhi is rethinking its approach toward China, after the 2020 border dispute brought relations to their lowest point in decades. The resumption of tourist visas and the flurry of high-level diplomatic engagements in recent months indicate that New Delhi is adopting a more pragmatic and flexible strategy toward China. While it remains unlikely that China-India relations will return to what they were pre-2020, Trump's trade policy targeting both these Asian giants seems to be driving them to a rapprochement. Trump's selective targeting of BRICS member nations through tariffs has also provided New Delhi with the impetus to renew its engagement with the grouping. In light of its waning influence within the BRICS grouping, India should use this opportunity to re-engage with the bloc and strengthen its credentials as a Global South leader, as it prepares to take over chairmanship next year. By neglecting the Global South through his 'America First' policies, Trump is indirectly aiding the transformation of BRICS — from a loose grouping of countries to one that is increasingly investing among themselves and turning regionally to oppose superpower bloc politics. India sees itself as a force in global politics, engaging in strategic multi-alignment to secure its national objectives. A long-standing criticism of New Delhi's foreign policy choices has been that it does not look beyond tactical challenges. This is an opportunity for New Delhi to make strategic choices that don't compromise its national interests, and to showcase its commitment to strategic autonomy. It is an opportunity for India to be truly strategically multialigned, economically diversified, and deeply integrated within the extended region.
The Diplomat
6 hours ago
- Business
- The Diplomat
India-Philippines Ties Now Strategic Partnership on Upward Trajectory
Visa-free travel, direct flights, technological cooperation and cultural exchanges are set to complement the new defense-heavy alignment, aiming to turn a once-distant relationship into a broad-based alliance. This August, the visit of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to India marked a historic milestone in the relations between the two nations. The president's visit, which took place between August 4-8, was the first such state visit since 2007. On August 5, India and the Philippines formally elevated their ties to a Strategic Partnership, backed by a comprehensive bilateral Plan of Action (2025–2029) signed in New Delhi. In all, 13 memoranda and agreements were signed during Marcos Jr.'s visit. The partnership spans defense, maritime cooperation, trade, digital technologies, tourism, space cooperation, culture and science. However, the transition from a prolonged historic stasis to the current phase of strategic dynamism has not been sudden. While India and the Philippines established bilateral diplomatic relations in 1949, thanks to Cold War politics, for decades, their partnership remained largely symbolic — anchored in mutual goodwill but unfulfilled potential. Initial limitations were rooted in geographical distance, divergent regional priorities and systemic constraints. Over time, however, India's Look East policy, re-branded in 2014 as the Act East policy, began paving the way for more meaningful engagement through ASEAN frameworks, and India's initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative and Security and Growth for All in the Region, whose acronym SAGAR means ocean in multiple Indian languages. This was upgraded to Mahasagar, meaning the great ocean, in March 2025. The expanded acronym stands for Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions. As India and the Philippines celebrate 75 years of bilateral ties, they stand stronger together at the cusp of making qualitative leaps in their relationship. Defense Ties Key Unlike several of its Southeast Asian peers, the Philippines does not have a strong trade relationship with India. The defense and security partnership has thus become the central pillar of the New Delhi-Manila strategic alignment. This is aptly reflected in the agreement on the sale of BrahMos supersonic cruise missile systems to the Philippines. This makes it the first country to procure these missiles from India. India's BrahMos cruise missile system, delivered in two batches (first in April 2024 and the second in April 2025), now empowers the Philippine Marine Corps with advanced coastal defense capability. This was India's first major defense export. During Marcos' recent visit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated that defense cooperation is 'a symbol of deep mutual trust.' In turn, Marcos emphasized the Philippines as a vital partner in India's Act East and Mahasagar vision. Manila is also eyeing procurement of the Akash surface-to-air missile system from India. Strategic Calculus and China On the eve of Marcos' visit, the Indian and Philippine navies conducted their first-ever joint exercises in the South China Sea on August 3-4. The drills were held inside the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone, as part of Manila's broader efforts to counter China's maritime assertiveness. India deployed three warships – INS Delhi, INS Shakti, and INS Kiltan – while the Philippines fielded BRP Miguel Malvar and BRP Jose Rizal. Chinese vessels reportedly followed the Indian-Philippine flotilla. This shift signals a strategic evolution in India's posture toward the Indo‑Pacific. Barring a few exceptions, India had previously avoided direct mentions of the South China Sea. However, New Delhi now explicitly endorses adherence to the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award, drawing focus on upholding a rules-based maritime order. For India, the South China Sea issue is no longer a peripheral concern, but is integral to its maritime and economic security as well as its regional leadership claims. The partnership with the Philippines is a tangible expression of India's Indo‑Pacific ambitions. India's presence there through joint naval patrols and supplying BrahMos to the Philippines reflects an operational follow-through, not just a diplomatic alignment. The aim is deterrence and presenting a viable counterweight to China's claims in a region critical to global trade, through which about $3 trillion worth of goods transit annually. Manila's pursuit of deeper ties with extra-regional partners such as India represents a deliberate move to reduce dependence on any single ally (for example, the U.S.) and forge multi-directional security and economic collaborations. Looking at the South China Sea (or West Philippine Sea, as the part within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone is called) issue from the Philippine perspective, it is clear that — barring perhaps Vietnam on occasion — no country has faced as much harassment over territorial claims at the hands of China as the Philippines has. Recognizing the need to balance China's assertiveness, both countries are prioritizing maritime cooperation, information sharing and defense engagements to protect a rules-based order in the area. Diversifying its security and defense partnerships would not only reduce the Philippines' dependency on any single country but also empower the Philippines and India to navigate the complex interplay of regional strategic dynamics effectively. Beyond Security This strategic realignment extends into non-military domains too. For instance, India and the Philippines announced visa-free entry for Indian tourists and free e-visas for Filipino nationals, alongside plans for direct Delhi–Manila flights, expected to expand bilateral tourism and people-to-people exchanges. It has not gone unnoticed in Manila that Thailand and Malaysia offered visa-free entry to Indian tourists and, as a result, saw great benefits in tourism. These recent moves promise to further strengthen people-to-people linkages between the two countries. The two sides have also agreed to launch a preferential trade negotiation, as bilateral trade remains modest ($3.3 billion in 2024), but has abundant room for growth. This is in tune with the ongoing review of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement that was implemented in 2010. India-Philippines collaboration frameworks span space exploration, digital innovation, culture, health and agriculture, all underpinned by the 2025–29 Plan of Action. India's strengths, including IT, digital inclusion, pharmaceuticals, and space, align closely with the Philippines' development goals, positioning the partnership for substantive impact beyond security. Once characterized by distant potential and limited interaction, the bilateral relationship between India and the Philippines is now evolving into a strong strategic partnership. In a changing Indo-Pacific region marked by increasing great-power rivalry, this partnership stands to benefit India's pursuit of its strategic objectives, and the Philippines' efforts for strategic diversification. Originally published by
